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LIST OP PARTIES 
The parties to this action are: 
1. Reed Maxfield, a Plaintiff and Appellant. 
2. Utah's Great Game Preserve, a Plaintiff and 
Appellant. 
3. Owen A. Rushton and Carol Rushton, his wife, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
4. State of Utah, by and through Utah State Department 
of Social Services, Third-party Defendants and Co-respondents. 
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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT AND CASE HISTORY 
Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. Sec. 78-2-2(3)(i). This appeal is from an Order of the 
trial court dismissing the plaintiff's causes of action because of 
the plaintiff's failure to diligently prosecute. 
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the trial court committed reversible error 
in dismissing the plaintiff's causes of action for failure to dil-
igently prosecute. 
2. Whether the trial court committed reversible error 
in denying plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment based upon the 
pleadings, affidavits, and factual circumstances surrounding this 
transaction. 
3. Whether the trial court committed reversible error 
in denying plaintiff's Motion for an Order Granting plaintiff the 
immediate right to redeem prior to trial of the case on its 
merits. 
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STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
None 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This action involves disputes relating to title and 
right of possession of two parcels of land situated in Salt lake 
County, Utah. 
Because title is the primary issue, a brief chronology 
of events outlining the chain of "ownership" may be helpful to the 
court. 
1. Lester and Maxine Romero were fee title owners prior 
to April 9, 1979. (R-19) 
2. Prior to April 9, 1979, Lester and Maxine Romero 
represented that they had assigned and sold the properties to 
Beaver Investment who subsequently assigned and sold its interest 
to Golden Circle Investment. Lester Romero controlled the enti-
ties known as Beaver Investment and Golden Circle Investment. 
3. On April 9, 1979, Lester and Maxine Romero conveyed 
the properties by quit-claim deed to Golden Circle Investment. 
(R-19) 
4. On April 9, 1979, Golden Circle Investment conveyed 
the properties by corporate quit-claim deed to Reed Maxfield. 
5. On June 29, 1979, the State of Utah, Division of 
Social Services, obtained a judgment based upon fraud against 
Lester Romero. (R-20) 
6. Reed Maxfield recorded the quit-claim deed from 
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Golden Circle to Maxfield on March 25, 1980. (R-20) 
7. The properties were sold by Sheriff's sale on 
October 1, 1980. (R-20) 
8. The defendants Owen and Carol Rushton purchased the 
property at the Sheriff's sale for the amount of the judgment 
against Lester Romero together with the costs of sale. (R-35, 
R-41) 
9. Reed Maxfield filed a Complaint on October 20, 1980, 
against the Rushtons alleging that he was the fee title owner of 
the property. Subsequently, on November 3, 1980, plaintiff filed 
an Amended Complaint. (R-2) 
10. Defendants Rushtons filed a Motion to Dismiss upon 
the grounds that they were innocent third-party purchasers, that 
Maxfield had not joined the State of Utah as a necessary party 
defendant, and that the relationship between Maxfield and Romero 
must be established in order to determine if the purported deed of 
conveyance was valid. (R-8) 
11. On March 11, 1981, plaintiff filed a Motion for 
Summary Judgment which was denied March 27, 1981. (R-13, R-52) 
12. Plaintiff filed a Petition for Interlocutory Appeal 
to the Supreme Court in April, 1981. Said Appeal was denied. 
13. On April 2, 1981, defendants Rushton did file an 
Answer, Counterclaim and Third-party Complaint joining the State 
of Utah in the action as a third-party defendant. (R-53, R-57) 
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14. On June 19, 1984, plaintiff filed another Motion for 
Summary Judgment which was denied by Judge David Dee on September 
25, 1984. A trial date was set for January 10, 1985. (R-215) 
15. On September 6, 1984, the defendants Rushton, pursu-
ant to court order, filed their Amended Answer and Counterclaim. 
(R-183, R-231) 
16. Plaintiff has never filed a reply to the Amended 
Counterclaim. 
17. On or about December 10, 1984, plaintiff filed a 
Motion to File a Second Amended Complaint. The defendants 
objected to the filing of the Second Amended Complaint upon the 
grounds that it was inappropriate to add new parties to the 
action and different causes of action including fraud and punitive 
damages which sound in tort and completely change plaintifffs the-
ory of the case upon the eve of trial. (R-244, R-255) 
18. In December 1984, the plaintiff filed a Petition in 
Bankruptcy for a Chapter 11 proceeding. (R-260) 
19. The trial date scheduled for January 10, 1985, was 
stayed by filing of Notice of Bankruptcy. (R-258) 
20. As part of the bankruptcy proceedings, the plaintiff 
caused the claim against the defendants to be assigned to the Utah 
Great Game Preserve, a Utah corporation controlled by the plain-
tiff and his family. Thereafter, the Stay was lifted enabling the 
case to be heard in the Third Judicial District Court. (Bankruptcy 
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84A-03391) 
21. On June 1, 1987, Judge Young, after hearing argu-
ments from the parties, set a scheduling order which included the 
first place trial setting of September 15, 1987. (R-313) 
22. On August 10, 1987, plaintiff's counsel filed a 
Motion to continue the trial date which was denied on August 17, 
1987. (R-332, R-355, R-424) 
23. Plaintiff filed a Motion to Dismiss all claims by 
any party against plaintiff on August 11, 1987. (R-359). 
Defendants replied to the plaintiff's Motion on August 14, 1987. 
(R-385) 
24. Plaintiff filed a Third Amended Complaint on August 
19, 1987. (R-404). Defendants objected to filing the Third 
Amended Complaint. (R-433). 
25. On August 24, 1987, the court denied plaintiff's 
Motion to Dismiss claims against plaintiff, Motion to File a Third 
Amended Complaint and denied defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment. (R-4 36) 
26. At the Pre-trial Hearing on August 31, 1987, with 
all parties present with counsel, the plaintiff presented a pro-
posed Third Amended Complaint enlarging upon the Second Amended 
Complaint and including a civil rights cause of action. 
Thereafter, plaintiff's counsel moved to be allowed to withdraw. 
After the court heard arguments from all the parties including the 
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plaintiff individually, the court dismissed plaintiff's causes of 
action for failure to prosecute. (R-437, R-438) 
27. Judgment was entered on September 30, 1987. (R-449) 
28. Plaintiff filed an objection to judgment which was 
denied. (R-470, R-471) 
29. Plaintiff then filed a Notice of Appeal. (R-469) 
The plaintiff's cause of action has been before the 
Third Judicial District Court from October 1980 to September 1987. 
The record clearly demonstrates that the plaintiff, by his own 
conduct, has continually delayed this matter by change of legal 
counsel, amended causes of action, and bankruptcy proceedings. 
All of the plaintifffs actions have been to the detriment of the 
defendants who, as innocent purchasers, have been compelled to pay 
mortgage payments owing at the time of the Sheriff's sale, 
together with taxes, insurance and the maintenance of old houses 
without the benefit of the Sheriff's Deed necessary to convey 
title. (R-73) 
Subsequent to the Sheriff's sale of the two parcels of 
real property on October 1, 1980, the plaintiff has had within 
his power, the right, and capability of an expeditious trial 
establishing the validity of his claim to fee title and his right 
to redeem. 
The defendants Rushton are innocent third-party pur-
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chasers of the real property at the Sheriff's sale, having no 
relationship with Maxfield or Romero. 
The Rushtons have continuously pressed for completion 
of discovery and setting prompt hearing dates. Defendants have 
filed three Requests for Trial Settings and obtained four (4) 
trial settings. The plaintiff, on the other hand, has objected to 
the Notices of Readiness, trial date settings, and made no effort 
whatsoever to have the matter expeditiously tried on its merits 
after plaintiff's Motions for Summary Judgment were denied. 
The Motions for Summary Judgment were not granted 
because it was clear that there were genuine issues of both law 
and fact. 
The plaintiff, failing to successfully obtain a Summary 
Judgment, then proceeded to seek the right to immediate redemp-
tion without first proving that he had valid title to the 
property. The trial court properly denied these Motions. 
Therefore, rather than seek an early trial date to 
resolve the issues, the plaintiff filed bankruptcy, had the cause 
of action assigned and transferred to a family corporation 
(Utah's Great Game preserve) and filed a Second and Third Amended 
Complaint for the purpose of adding defendants and causes of 
action that substantially changed plaintiff's original theory of 
the case. 
The court on August 31, 1987, at the pretrial 
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conference, upon being confronted with continuing efforts by the 
plaintiff to delay the case again for non-meritorious reasons, 
dismissed the case for failure to timely prosecute, (R-437, 
R-438) 
The delays have been very detrimental to the Rushtons 
who have been required to pay all of the monthly mortgage 
payments, taxes, insurance and borrow money to repair the houses 
despite the fact that they have not been able to obtain a 
Sheriff's Deed for seven (7) years due to the delaying tactics of 
the plaintiff• 
I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
IN DISMISSING PLAINTIFF'S CAUSES OF ACTION 
FOR FAILURE TO PROSECUTE 
This matter has been pending before the Third Judicial 
District Court in Salt Lake County since October 20, 1980, when 
the plaintiff filed his Complaint alleging he was the fee title 
owner and that the State of Utah had caused to be conducted an 
improper Sheriff's sale. 
Since that date, the plaintiff has filed two amended 
complaints and on the date of the pre-trial, August 31, 1987, 
sought to file a Third Amended Complaint seeking relief on an 
entirely new theory involving the violation of civil rights and 
seeking punitive damages against the various defendants including 
the State of Utah. (R-404) 
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Counsel for the defendants Rushton have filed two 
Certificates of Readiness for Trial, to wit: February 8, 1984 
(R-82), and November 24, 1986 (R-264), and a Motion for Immediate 
Trial Setting on April 27, 1987 (R-291). On each occasion, plain-
tiff objected to said requests on the grounds that more discovery 
was necessary• 
The court has scheduled four trial date settings, 
namely: April 30, 1984 (R-89); September 10, 1984 (R-90); January 
10, 1985 (R-215); and September 15, 1987 (R-309). 
The court file is replete with pleadings on the part of 
the defendants seeking a court determination of this matter and 
plaintiff objecting to every effort to have the issues tried or in 
the alternative, doing nothing in a constructive effort to resolve 
the issues raised by the pleadings. However, it should be noted 
that counsel for plaintiff has taken the depositions of Owen 
Rushton, Carol Rushton and Stephen Schwendiman. Defendants have 
taken the deposition of the plaintiff Maxfield. All the deposi-
tions were completed before the end of 1984, three and one-half 
years ago. 
All the delays have been directly caused by the plain-
tiff, including the filing of a petition in bankruptcy on December 
10, 1984, which included the successful effort of having this 
cause of action, as an asset of Maxfield, to be transferred to the 
Maxfield "close family11 corporation known as Utah's Great Game 
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Preserve for the payment of a "debt" thus preventing creditors 
from attaching any interest in this cause of action. Bankruptcy 
Judge John Allen lifted a Stay Against Proceeding and remanded the 
matter to the Third Judicial District Court where it continued to 
flounder despite defendants1 efforts to have the matter heard. 
Finally, at the pretrial conference on August 31, 1987 
(R-437), the plaintiff's counsel (in the presence of Maxfield) 
again tried to amend the Complaint changing the entire theory of 
the case, moved for further continuance, and sought to withdraw as 
counsel upon the grounds that he had not been paid. The court 
then gave Mr. Maxfield an opportunity to speak. After hearing 
argument from all the parties and their counsel, the court cor-
rectly ruled that the plaintiff's case must be dismissed for fail-
ure to prosecute. Seven years was adequate time to frame the 
issues and theory of the case, complete discovery, and have the 
matter tried. 
The record shows that between August 31, 1987, and the 
present time, three separate lawyers have entered appearances in 
addition to pro se actions on the part of the plaintiff. It is 
evident that there is no end in sight if the court does not take 
appropriate action to prevent abuse of the court system to the 
detriment of the Rushtons who have been making mortgage payments, 
insurance premiums and taxes as well as incurring maintenance 
expense for seven years without a Sheriff's Deed due to the delay-
ing actions of the plaintiff. 
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The Utah Supreme Court has consistently held that 
"The ruling of the court below will not be disturbed 
unless the record plainly shows that the court below 
abused its discretion." Westinghouse Electric Supply 
Company v. Paul W. Larsen Contractor, Inc., 544 P2d 876 
(1975) . 
This is true whether a party to the action moves the 
court for an order of dismissal for failure to prosecute or the 
court acts on its own. Brasher Motor and Finance Company v. 
Brown, 23 Utah 2d 247, 461 P2d 464 (1969). 
The Supreme Court has generally followed five (5) basic 
factors to determine if dismissal is justified. They are: 
1. The conduct of both parties. 
2. The opportunity each has had to move the case 
forward. 
3. What each of the parties have done to move the 
case forward. 
4. What difficulty or prejudice may have been 
caused to the other side. 
5. And, most important, whether injustice may 
result from the dismissal. 
(See K.L.C. Inc. v. Ron McLean, 656 P.2d 986) 
In applying these five standards, it is conclusively 
established that the court did not abuse its discretion in dis-
missing plaintiff's cause of action. 
First, there is nothing in the record to indicate that 
the plaintiff did anything to encourage the setting of a trial 
date. When plaintiff1s Motions for Summary Judgment were not 
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granted, the plaintiff did nothing except to file a petition in 
bankruptcy and seek to prevent creditors from claiming an interest 
in his "alleged title" to the properties which are the subject of 
this case. 
On the other hand, defendants took the appropriate 
depositions, filed Interrogatories and Request for Production of 
Documents (which were only answered after defendants filed a 
Motion to Compel [R-180]), and filed two Certificates of Readiness 
and Motion for Immediate Trial over a three-year period. 
Defendants did everything possible to have this matter heard. 
Second, each party had an equal opportunity to move the 
case forward. The plaintiff had the burden of proof, but it was 
the defendants who were continually seeking a resolution of the 
issues. There is nothing in the record to indicate that plaintiff 
was justified in failing to proceed expeditiously. 
Third, the actions taken by the parties to move the case 
forward is described in paragraph first above. However, it is 
submitted that the plaintiff has not only taken no affirmative 
steps to move his case forward, he has continually fils^ d objec-
tions and obstructed the defendants and the court from moving 
forward. The file includes plaintiff's objections to every 
Certificate of Readiness for Trial, Motion for Immediate Trial 
Setting, or court orders seeking to schedule an orderly procedure 
to conclude the case. 
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Fourth, the defendants have done nothing to prejudice or 
create difficulties for the plaintiff. Any prejudice claimed to 
be suffered by the plaintiff has arisen from his own acts or 
omissions. The plaintiff's objections to defendants1 efforts 
seeking to go forward, his failure to respond to Request for 
Production of Documents and Answers to Interrogatories, and his 
continual Motions to amend the Complaint, have prejudiced defen-
dants from having a hearing on the issues within a reasonable 
time. It is submitted that seven (7) years is not reasonable, 
especially when the issues are not that complex. 
Fifth, no injustice will result from this court affirm-
ing the trial court's Order of Dismissal. Not only did the 
plaintiff take every step to avoid an expeditious trial, he cannot 
suffer any financial loss because through his personal bankruptcy 
petition, he caused any interest he had in the subject property to 
be conveyed to Utah's Great Game Preserve, a Utah corporation. A 
party cannot be heard to complain when he has been the creator of 
his own world of problems. It was the plaintiff who abused the 
court system and cannot now be heard to complain that the judi-
cial system has taken inappropriate action. 
On the other hand, the defendants Rushton will suffer 
great injustice if the court Order of Dismissal is not upheld. 
They were purchasers in good faith of the property pursuant to a 
Sheriff's sale October 1, 1980 (R-35, R-41). Since that date, 
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when they paid the amount required at the Sheriff's sale, they 
have been compelled to repair two houses that were in a bad state 
of repair, paid monthly mortgage payments on both properties, paid 
real property taxes for the years 1980 through 1987, paid insur-
ance premiums and substantial attorney fees, all of which exceeded 
the limited rental income they were able to receive (R-73). The 
Rushtons are both elderly and it is important that they be allowed 
to secure the property Sheriff's Deed and be assured they can con-
tinue to pay for the properties knowing that they will obtain 
legal title. 
In support of this great expense, Carol Rushton executed 
an Affidavit dated December 8, 1981 (R-73), which is part of the 
record and which outlined expenses for the first year as follows: 
Repairs to property at 3020 W. 2995 S. $7,048.06 
Repairs to property at 606 Colorado St. 694.09 
Insurance 150.00 
Delinquent mortgage payments 431.00 
Granger-Hunter Water District 60.00 
Repair furnace 30.00 
December 22, 1980 (First Security mortgage 
payment) 97.00 
Interest paid on loan taken out to improve 
the property 272.52 
Attorneys fees to date 872.52 
Since 1981, the defendants have carried the burden of 
similar charges. 
To permit the plaintiff to return to the Third Judicial 
District Court and pursue this matter would constitute a substan-
tial injustice to the Rushtons. The plaintiff, by his conduct and 
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his bankrupt financial condition, has clearly demonstrated that he 
should not be allowed to continue his irresponsible actions to the 
detriment of the Rushtons. To grant further hearings and to grant 
any right of redemption under these circumstances would be to com-
pound the injustice that the plaintiff has already committed. 
In conclusion, the Supreme Court in K.L.C. Inc. v. 
McLean, 656 P2d 986 at page 987 declared: 
Under such circumstances, a trial could serve no 
useful purpose. The protraction of the case for four-
teen years, and the hopelessness of any recovery by 
either side justified the trial courtfs dismissal on 
plaintiff's motion, as might also have occurred sua 
sponte and on the court's own motion. 
It is submitted that the trial court in reviewing the 
pleadings and considering all of the circumstances not only did 
not abuse his discretion, but carried out the court's obligation 
to provide fair and expeditious hearings for litigating parties. 
This view has always been the findings and ruling of the 
Utah Supreme Court. Wright v. Howe, et al., 150 P. 956 (Utah 
1915); Thompson Ditch Co. v. Jackson, et al., 29 Utah 2nd 259, 508 
P.2d 528 (1973); Maxfield v. Fishier, 538 P2d 1323 (Utah 1975); 
Utah Oil Company v. Harris, 565 P2d 1135 (Utah 1977); Johnson v. 
Firebrand, Inc., 571 P.2d 1369 (Utah 1977); Dept. of Social 
Services v. Romero, 609 P2d 1323 (Utah 1980). 
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II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Historically, the Utah Supreme Court has not reversed a 
trial's court with respect to rulings on Motions for Summary 
Judgment unless there is clearly an abuse of discretion or the 
trial court is in error as a matter of law. The burden is upon 
the moving party and the defending party is given the benefit of 
every doubt in order to insure that parties, if legally deserving, 
shall have their day in court. 
The plaintiff argues that his first Motion for Summary 
Judgment filed before an answer had been filed or any discovery 
had taken place was error as a matter of law. The defendants were 
only aware that they were innocent purchasers of real property 
being sold by the Sheriff of Salt Lake County to enforce a judg-
ment against a fee title owner of the property by the name of 
Romero. 
After plaintiff filed his first Motion for Summary 
Judgment (R-13), he filed a Motion and Notice of Hearing to Extend 
Time for Redemption and Motion for Deposit of Funds into Court 
(R-50). 
On March 27, 1981, the court heard arguments on 
defendants' Motions to Dismiss and plaintiff's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. The court denied the Motion for Summary Judgment upon 
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^ e g rounds that :i t was premati lr e (R- 52 ) 
However, the court did grant plaintiff an extension of 
the redemption perio ; t^thermore, the court authorized the 
defendants b : - *- 5 2 ) 
Thereafter, Apr:. r:^  defendants filed an 
Answer and Countered $ * r< ar • r ~.. r d - re - r v *rr: . aint "j oi n inq the 
State t lit i in i r 'i I . . : -*. : : . Led an intermediate 
Appeal, The Intermediate Appeal was denied. (Record do-- not 
disclose Intermediate Ant*--': ) 
C. .. acember ^ .:,-. . ^ a m t ;: : : . ,- : a Motion ^-^ 
Possession oi Real Property and Assignment of Fer.r^ :?-£' 
Motion was b i r i c ^ •: '.*---i-v-mhr-* •-.- : •-* 
1-j, ..-it4, pleintirr. i^-ed a second Motio.-. i^ r Summary Judgment en 
the same issues •;?.--9: Defendants Hushton objected to the 
pi a: =• *• ^  * ' • • * •• . . . • . •: pi ev j oui-ily 
grantee tne parties furtne: discovery at pre-trial conference on 
June 19, 19^4 ^R~iS8;, therefore, a nearing on Summary Judgment 
After discovery had been "completed,11 the plaintiff 
filed a Second Amended Complaint adding new defendants a- -.— - ^1 
_: September 2h , "96 4 the plai ntiff's Motion for 
SummarT~ judgment was neard ana aenied. fi i l ea; • * a] was set for 
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On November 30, 1984, plaintiff's Motions relating to 
rights of redemption were argued and the court reserved ruling 
until date of trial• (R-230) 
On December 10, 1984, the plaintiff filed a petition in 
bankruptcy, thereby staying further proceedings. (R-260) 
Under these facts and circumstances, there is no factual 
or legal basis for reversing the trial court's denial of the 
plaintiff's first and second Motions for Summary Judgment. 
It is difficult to understand the legal reasoning of the 
plaintiff in seeking a reversal of the court's denial of the first 
Motion for Summary Judgment when subsequently an Intermediate 
Appeal was denied, the plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint 
and thereafter filed a second Motion for Summary Judgment which 
was also denied. Certainly, there could be no legal rational 
basis that could allow the plaintiff's first Motion for Summary 
Judgment to survive all of the intervening actions and be heard 
again. 
The plaintiff/appellant strenuously argues that the 
Affidavit filed by Rushtons' counsel does not adequately raise 
questions of law or fact to successfully challenge the 
plaintiff's first Motion for Summary Judgment. This superficial 
argument was denied by the trial court upon several grounds: 
First, there had been a Motion to Dismiss filed which on its face 
raised several serious issues; namely, the State of Utah had not 
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been joi ned as a necessary party, the defendants Ri 1 shtc • i 1 wer e 
i ru locen t: bona fi de third-party purchasers under a Sheriff" s sale, 
and that the relationship between Maxfield and Romero raised a 
question as to the validity ' tu- ,3 ed fimn Rnnu i • I. Mixfi e] d. 
Secondly, there ha: ceer. inadequate time to complete 
discovery. 
Third];/ defendants should be given adequate t ime to 
file an answer to raise the .legal issues of fraud, necessary 
joinder and the validity of the purported deeds of conveyanop. 
I" h k- i" o 1.i [ I " i •; (j e n i a I «: • > I t h e ! 1 o t i on for Summa r y Judgment 
based upon the above rationale is fully supported by prior :ie--i-
sions of the Utah Supreme court. 
The defendants were entitled to have all the evidence 
and inferences construed In their favor, In Bower v, Riverton 
City, 656 P2d 434 { 1 c»R2 ) , I.he Supreme Court utritrd at. page 436: 
If there is any doubt or uncertainty concerning 
questions of fact, the dbout should be resolved in 
favor of the opposing party. Thus, the court must 
evaluate all of the evidence and all reasonable infer-
ences fairly drawn from the evidence in a light most 
favorable to the opposing summary judgment. 
Tv - - - - ' • - declrueui hial .in Jlidd^il is not 
even essentia, i: successfully contest a Motion for Summary 
Judgment, . :\ ::e r :-.«1 ~ - - R. C. P . i 
The adverse party prior to the day of hearing may 
serve opposing affidavits, but is not required to do 
so. He may stand upon his pleadings providing his 
allegations, if proved, would establish a basis for 
. recovery. [Christensen v. Financial Service Co., Inc., 
377 P.2d 1010 (1963) . ] 
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The Motion to Dismiss clearly raised substantial and 
genuine issues of law and fact. Furthermore, defendants1 Answer, 
Counterclaim, and Third-party Complaint joining the State of Utah 
were filed immediately after the plaintiff's Motion for Summary 
Judgment was denied, specifically pleading the issues with par-
ticularity. Subsequent pleadings have fully established the 
existence of genuine issues between the plaintiff and 
defendants. 
Ill 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING THE 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR AN ORDER ALLOWING 
IMMEDIATE RIGHT OF REDEMPTION 
The defendants do not argue that property sold in 
accordance with a Sherifffs sale is not subject to rights of 
redemption. Rule 69 U.R.C.P. specifically provides a right of 
redemption to a judgment debtor or a creditor having a lien by 
judgment or mortgage on the property sold, or on some share or 
part thereof. 
The trial court recognized rights of redemption, under 
Rule 69, but concluded that he could not order redemption until 
such time as the plaintiff clearly proved that he qualified as 
one having a right to redeem. The whole purpose of the litiga-
tion was to establish whether a right of redemption rested with 
Romero (or his corporate successors in interest, namely: Golden 
Circle, Inc.) or Maxfield. Therefore, the trial court extended 
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the rights of" r n d emp t ion f o r t h e pu r p o :> e o f »11 v i r i -1 t h»' • plniiil ill" 
ai 1 opportunity to establish that he had J JegaJ right to redeem. 
The trial court committed no error by extending rather 
than granting ri~:"":: *" redemption. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on al 1 of the above, and on the record below, the 
defendants/respondents respectfully submit that the trial court 
did n ~ if ;m," o n M in denying pi aint i I!; ' s Motion for 
Summary Judgment or right to immediately redeem. 
The acts and omissions of the plaintiff have been del-
ij.nient.dl I I lie deiendants Kushton who are now entitled to 
receive a Sheriff's Deed to the real property. They have main-
tained the property for se\/f\n i; l ;i ) 'ear's at. great financial risk. 
Continued delay wjii create only more hardship for the Rushtons 
who in their elderly age may never sur vive more trial dates and 
appeals. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 14th day of Apri 1, 1 988 
NYGAARD, COKE & VINCENT 
,^%f»^- _ 
HenryC6./Nygaard 
Attorney'or Respondents Rushton 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I I teby certify that on the 14th day of April, 1988, T 
mailed, postage prepaid, four copies of the foregoing Brief of 
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Respondents to counsel for the State of Utah and counsel for 
Appellant Maxfield at the addresses shown on the cover of this 
Brief. 
^ 
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